Modern cryptography assumes the availability of Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) and digital signature schemes. However their existence is currently based on the conjectured hardness of some problems like integer factorization [RSA78], discrete logarithm [Gam85] , lattice based problems [Reg03] to name a few. It is not reasonable to base security of a real-life system on conjectured hardness (which might be proven incorrect in the due course of time). Also, advent of new computing paradigms, such as quantum computing has already rendered quite a few of such techniques ineffective. For instance Shor in [Sho94] showed that integer factorization and discrete logarithm problems can be solved in polynomial time, given access to a quantum computer. Hence, it is worthwhile to look at information theoretically secure schemes, which assume the worst case that the adversary has unbounded computational powers [Sha79, BGW88, CCD88].
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While dealing with the problems in the area of Fault-Tolerant Distributed Computing, it is widely assumed that every pair of participating nodes in a communication network shares a channel between them. This channel helps them to directly send messages to each other in a reliable, secure and authentic manner without involving other nodes in the network, some of whom may be faulty. However, in practice, most of the nodes in a network do not share any channel between them and hence must take the help of other nodes, by means of a protocol.
We consider a distributed setting where a subset of nodes are under the control of a malicious adversary with unbounded computational powers. The problem of simulating a directed reliable channel from a sender S to a receiver R in the absence of a true physical point to point channel is fundamental to the area of Distributed Computing and is popularly known as "Unconditionally Reliable Message Transmission" (URMT).
Analogous to randomized sequential algorithms, we distinguish between two variants of reliability: while the weaker variant allows R to output an incorrect message with small probability (Monte Carlo), the stronger variant allows the protocol to only abort with a small probability but never output an incorrect message (Las Vegas). We consider these variants in two popular timing models: synchronous and asynchronous. The former has a fixed upper bound on the amount of time it takes to transmit a message over any physical channel of the network whereas the latter doesn't have any such upper bound.
We focus on the possibility of Las Vegas and Monte Carlo protocols by modeling the network as a synchronous or asynchronous directed graph. Unlike the approach taken in literature where a digraph is abstracted as a collection of disjoint wires and the nodes along the wires are mere routers, we consider digraphs in their entirety -every node can potentially do arbitrary computations on the messages i.e. every node is as powerful as a Turing Machine.
In this work, we establish a novel hierarchy with respect to the minimum connectivity requirements for the existence of synchronous Las Vegas, asynchronous Monte Carlo and asynchronous Las Vegas protocols for URMT. We show that, with respect to URMT, the (minimum) connectivity requirements for the existence of synchronous Las Vegas protocols are the same as those for asynchronous Monte Carlo protocols i.e. one is possible if and only the other is possible -a pleasantly surprising equivalence between two very different models. Furthermore, the connectivity requirements for asynchronous Las Vegas URMT (which are strictly higher than those for Monte Carlo URMT) are the same as those required for perfect protocols over synchronous networks! While it is well-known that, in synchronous networks, the minimum connectivity requirements for Monte Carlo URMT protocols to exist is strictly less than those where for perfect protocols, we establish the fact that the connectivity requirements for the case of Las Vegas URMT are strictly more than that of Monte Carlo URMT.
We further improve our insight (into URMT) by studying how sparse a digraph that permits URMT can be. Specifically, we say that an edge is critical if its removal renders the graph insufficiently connected for URMT protocols (though before its removal the connectivity was sufficient). Ironically, it turns out that for digraphs over n nodes, the number of critical edges is always O(n) for perfect protocols whereas for the "easier" randomized protocols (the ones demanding lesser connectivity requirements compared to the perfect ones), we give a family of digraphs with Ω(n 2 ) critical edges! Hence, establishing an interesting interplay, for the case of URMT.
With the above results, we draw attention to a surprising interplay between the randomized versus perfect protocols, that is, randomized protocols demanding lesser connectivity sometimes have higher number of critical edges when compared to the case of perfect protocols.
Note: A part of the work presented in the thesis appeared in DISC 2010 [MAS10] . Full paper is available on e-print archieves [AM10] which is to be communicated to ICDCN 2011.
